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Abstract
The emergence of new platforms for public communication, public  deliberation, 
and public action presents new possibilities for forming, organizing, and 
mobilizing public bodies, which invite philosophical reflection concerning the 
standards we currently look to for coordinating public movements and for 
evaluating their effects. Developing a broad understanding of public philos-
ophy, this article begins with the view of philosophy and intellectual freedom 
articulated in Kant’s publicly oriented writings. We then focus on the power of 
philosophical discourse to form and further articulate public bodies. Drawing 
on Dewey’s work, we discuss the role of philosophical discourse in the artic-
ulation of publics into self-regulated, sovereign entities. We conclude with an 
account of how publishing itself might come to play an important role in the 
practice of public philosophy in a digital age.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, public philosophy has become an increasingly visi-
ble enterprise,1 yet no general consensus has emerged within the academy 
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concerning its overall value, its relationship to the philosophical tradition, 
or the proper standards for its exercise.2 For some, at least, this presents 
a troubling state of affairs. Academics who are attracted both to publicly 
engaged projects and to scholarly research face professional and institu-
tional challenges in pursuing both. For others, however, this state of affairs 
is simply to be expected. The ways in which philosophy is practiced outside 
of the academy, in and with the public, seem bound to generate uncertainty 
concerning its academic status and value.3
Instead of offering suggestions regarding how to establish meaningful 
academic consensus concerning public philosophy, we will here articulate a 
perspective from which the absence of such consensus is seen less as a lam-
entable deficiency and more as an important opportunity for investigating 
possibilities during a time of transition. The emergence of new platforms for 
public communication, public deliberation, and public action presents new 
possibilities for forming, organizing, and mobilizing public bodies, which 
invite philosophical reflection concerning the standards we currently look 
to for coordinating public movements and for evaluating their effects. What 
looks to many to be a time of crisis concerning public standards can well 
appear to philosophers of a certain mindset to be, instead, an opportunity 
to demonstrate some of the productive roles that philosophical discourses 
can play during the periods of upheaval that characterize the historical exis-
tence of even the most stable of cultural institutions.
The lack of consensus within the academy concerning the value of public 
philosophy is, roughly speaking, mirrored by a lack of consensus within 
the general public concerning the value of academic philosophy. This same 
state in relation to public opinion and support also characterizes many of 
the arts and sciences that share with philosophy both a common ancestry 
and a common reliance on continued public support for the kinds of insti-
tutions in which these practices are best able to thrive. Our hope is that new 
modes of broadly philosophical discourse allow us to model some tradi-
tional values in ways that can prove transformative in relation to the public 
bodies that are partially responsible for decisions that impact the future of 
the discipline.
A public body that incorporates the diverse methods, interests, and 
practices of its various members and, yet, is capable of self-determination, 
has to be one that is capable of reflective self-awareness concerning the 
range of its own values and the tensions that arise from its own internal 
standards. It also has to be sensitive to the values that form part of the self- 
awareness of the other public bodies with which it interacts. We maintain 
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that deliberation within these self-determining and other-regarding bodies 
can play its designated role only if it is characterized by certain freedoms—
namely, freedom from the doctrinal constraints that, often rightly, attach 
to members of the various organizations that comprise them, and freedom 
to pursue questions about its own good, wherever they might lead, in an 
accessible and intellectually honest fashion.
Our perspective concerning freedom, public philosophy, and philosoph-
ical publics can be understood as a contemporary version of a traditional 
line of thinking that continues to resonate with many, despite the differ-
ences of time, place, and context that separate us from earlier proponents, 
and despite the general recognition that it is open to debate concerning 
many of its particulars. Although aspects of the view can be traced back 
to Socrates and Plato, we look to more recent historical figures, such as 
Kant and Dewey, and to more recent public scholars, such as Eileen Joy 
and Noëlle McAfee, in working out our view of the mutual dependencies 
between philosophical thinking and a vital public sphere. This view empha-
sizes the role that philosophy, broadly construed, plays in constituting pub-
lics capable of functioning as relatively autonomous, self-regulating, and 
other-regarding bodies.
Scholarly publication, on this model, can respond to the common crit-
icism that it is an elitist endeavor by and for experts. It can also be an eco-
system of interrelated agents and processes in which complex functional 
bodies that can be motivated to act by appeal to public memory, public 
sensibilities, and public reasons are generated, organized, and maintained. 
The ecosystem is constituted through discursive practices that cultivate 
relationships involving features that are realizable across practices, such as 
the giving and taking of reasons, as well as the inclusion of a diversity of 
viewpoints within processes of pursuing practical interests that can be iden-
tified by each as being common to all.
In what follows, we present a detailed outline of this view of public phi-
losophy and performative publication. We begin with a focus on a rather 
broad construal of the practice of philosophy. Here, we question some of 
the received wisdom concerning the relationship between philosophy and 
other arts and sciences, and then draw on aspects of the view of philosophy 
and intellectual freedom that Kant offers in his publicly oriented writings 
(Part I). We then turn to a focus on the power of philosophical discourse to 
form articulate public bodies. We see this power expressed, at least in inten-
tion, in Kant’s own public writings and explore its possibilities through some 
contemporary reflections on what Kant himself is and is not able to do in 
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his own historical and political context (Part II). Finally, we discuss the role 
of philosophical discourse in the articulation of publics into self-regulating, 
sovereign entities. Dewey provides us with some tools for articulating this 
role, and also points us toward some of the challenges we face in attempting 
to realize these aspirations in our current social and political contexts (Part 
III). We conclude with some reflections on the promises involved in main-
taining the attitude toward public philosophy that we put forth here and 
provide some suggestions for informally testing the guiding assumptions of 
the model we develop.
Part I: Philosophy Broadly Construed
The primary aims of this first part are to direct our focus to a broad way 
of thinking about the practice of philosophy and to begin tracing out the 
results this way of thinking might have for understanding what public phi-
losophy is or might be. Beginning with the many uses of the term “phi-
losophy” commonly found within the university, we focus on a use that 
connotes a specific freedom that is enjoyed by faculty across the various 
arts and sciences. In addition to uniting a faculty that remains diverse in 
many equally relevant ways, this kind of freedom also represents one of 
the central commonalities between members of our somewhat closed (or 
even cloistered) academic communities and members of the broader social 
communities of which the academy is a part. As a result, a focus on philos-
ophy broadly construed serves as a way of connecting academic freedom 
within the university to the more open, more publicly visible, and more 
publicly accountable networks in which academics and nonacademics alike 
exercise their social and political freedoms. This focus suggests that there 
are substantive relations between the practice of philosophy and the work 
required of a self-governing public, and that these relationships can become 
obscured by narrower, more rigidly disciplinary, ways of thinking about 
philosophy.4
1.1 The Free and Open Pursuit of Truth
Whatever particular questions, problems, or methodological norms are 
currently constitutive of the practice of philosophy qua academic disci-
pline, philosophy can also be characterized, roughly and provisionally, as 
the free and open pursuit of truth. Such a broad and intentionally inclusive 
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characterization of philosophy is not intended to meet the standards of an 
essential definition. It serves to remind us, rather, that there is a common 
thread of philosophical inquiry that continues to unite the arts and sciences 
despite their autonomy as self-sufficient units within most contemporary 
universities.
There is a historical basis for this common thread revealed in the com-
mon origins of so many disciplines in the practice of philosophy. Many 
stories can be told about the genealogy of these various disciplines, how and 
when they emerge, and what led to their being recognized as distinct parts 
of the whole of learning. None of these stories, however, establishes that 
these disciplines’ breaks with the philosophical 
tradition have ever been clearly delineated and 
absolute.5 Whatever criticisms may be offered 
from one side or the other of cultural divides 
between philosophy and other disciplines, the 
continuities between these disciplines are as rele-
vant as the breaks. We may understand the term 
“philosophy” as one that has been adapted to the 
needs of some disciplinary economies, yet is one 
that can still function just as much to describe 
how one is engaged within some discipline as it 
does to describe some specific discipline in rela-
tion to which one might form a scholarly identity.
There is a legitimate use of the term “philos-
ophy” that refers us to the specific topics that 
we now associate with work supported by phi-
losophy departments.6 This use, however, is as 
much the product of a contested history as are 
our current uses of terms such as “physics,” “biology,” “sociology,” “psy-
chology,” “anthropology,” “classics,” and so forth, as ways to designate dis-
ciplines other than philosophy. The descriptive usage of these terms that 
we now generally take for granted arises out of the prior staking of value 
claims as to what people are doing and what they are not doing. As with 
other identity claims advanced from the first person perspective, it isn’t 
always clear whether they are reports of already established facts, decla-
rations of independence, or more proscribed programmatic suggestions. 
The narrower way of construing the term “philosophy” in signifying disci-
plines distinct from philosophy, all arise within an historically and socially 
The narrower way of 
construing the term 
‘philosophy’ and the 
correlative use of other 
terms in signifying 
disciplines distinct from 
philosophy, all arise 
within an historically 
and socially situated, 
yet also open-ended 
and ongoing, discourse 
concerning truth and 
knowledge.
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situated discourse concerning truth and  knowledge. This discourse itself 
can be identified as a philosophical discourse.
What is at stake in acknowledging this suggestion will differ from case 
to case. In the case at hand, we think the value comes in understanding 
what public philosophy is. Open-ended philosophical discourse should be 
promoted when we think about how to address issues of public concern. 
The most vexing challenges we face as conscientious members of deliber-
ative public bodies cannot be grasped through the disciplinary discourses 
of biology, chemistry, political science, sociology, economics, or literary 
criticism, any better than they can be resolved through the analysis of con-
cepts and the investigation of linguistic conventions. Whatever it may be 
that each of our academic disciplinary perspectives allows us to bring to 
the intellectual work required for responding to the public challenges we 
face, our actual contributions to this work are made as public thinkers. We 
enjoy a freedom from the absolute authority of any single set of doctrines. 
We are responsible to other members of the public for whatever authority 
we give to our own commitments and for whatever authority we claim for 
ourselves, within an open discussion. When contributing to the intellectual 
work of the public, we are all called upon to do so as philosophers in the 
broadest sense.
1.2 Historical Precedent for Philosophy Broadly Construed
One model for the use of the term “philosophy” is provided by Kant’s 
 discussion of the structure and purpose of universities in a 1798 work 
 entitled The Conflict of the Faculties. Kant is the first modern philosopher 
to make his living teaching courses at a university and writing books and 
essays addressed to a public of both academic and nonacademic readers. 
While he is best remembered in contemporary academic circles for works 
that even specialists find difficult to approach, his activities as a lecturer, a 
university administrator, and a public intellectual are guided by a concep-
tion of philosophical practice that is anything but rigidly scholastic.7
In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant addresses significant points of 
dispute that arise from his work as a public scholar who also functions 
within the contexts of the university and the Prussian state.8 In the first 
part of the work, he describes the philosophical faculty of the university 
in terms of the specific freedoms it enjoys;9 namely, freedom from the 
 government-sanctioned doctrinal constraints that are placed on other 
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faculties in the university, and freedom to pursue the truth wherever it 
might lead in making a contribution to the world of learning.
In Kant’s account, the intellectual labor of the community of thinkers 
referred to as “the university” is divided among four faculties: theology, law, 
medicine, and philosophy. Each of these faculties is granted the power to 
admit students from lower schools and to confer the status of “doctor” on 
teachers who pass certain examinations. The central difference between the 
first three higher faculties and the lower faculty of philosophy has less to 
do with the particular subjects that occupy their members than with the 
authority exercised by the state in relation to those members through set-
ting the curriculum.
The higher faculties exist to prepare students to take up official offices 
and other roles within the state. Their members are contractually bound to 
follow state mandates concerning the religious, legal, and medical doctrines 
that the ministers of state have decided are essential for ensuring spiri-
tual, civic, and bodily well being within the state. These faculty members 
are under the command of the state, and they, in turn, are authorized to 
command their students’ compliance with these doctrines. This particular 
relation between the state, its doctrines, and the learned persons that are 
entrusted to indoctrinate subjects requires (1) that teaching be based on 
writings, (2) that these writings provide statutes, and (3) that these statutes 
have their sanction in the willful decree of an authority:
So the biblical theologian (as a member of a higher faculty) draws his 
teachings not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets 
his, not from natural law, but from the law of the land; and the profes-
sor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on 
the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical 
regulations.10
As subjects of the state seeking positions within the state, students are 
commanded to obey these teachings (or suffer the consequences). If they 
ask why they should obey, the only answer is one that makes reference to 
the will of the relevant authority. The biblical theologian takes the statutes 
that are found in the Bible, accepts that they are sanctioned by the will of 
God, and bases his teaching about what God requires of us on this text. 
There is nothing beyond the empirically given, or biblically revealed, and 
traditionally accepted fact of God’s command to which a biblical theologian 
could appeal for justification within this professional context.
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According to the logic of Kant’s discussion, if dissatisfaction with this 
line of response prompts a student to search for something beyond this 
given, the student crosses over into asking questions that can be treated 
only within an area of study in which the members of the higher, theo-
logical, faculty cannot be assumed to have any special expertise. Each of 
the texts on which their expertise is based simply records and reports facts 
about laws and regulations. They don’t provide the reader, whether novice 
or expert, the reasons why these laws and regulations were decided upon 
in the first place.
So, if a student were to ask questions about such matters, he or she 
would need to consult the lower faculty of philosophy. Philosophy faculty 
do not have access to some other book that con-
tains other statutes and authoritative answers that 
are provided at a level that will satisfy the curious 
student completely. Their training, however, does 
qualify them to help the student see avenues open 
for pursuing such questions. Their pursuit requires 
the further exercise of the rational capacities that 
are evidenced by the student’s state of intellectual 
dissatisfaction with reliance simply on accepted 
facts.
The lower philosophy faculty doesn’t have the 
same elevated position of authority in relation 
to the state, or in relation to its students, that the 
higher faculties have. They are left free to inves-
tigate the claims of biblical theology through the 
use of reason, to appeal to the tradition of natural 
law in arguments concerning the status of the de 
facto laws of the land, and to engage in physiological investigations of the 
human body in considering its functioning and possible alternative meth-
ods of therapy. Members of the philosophy faculty are not commanded 
by the state to believe and to teach particular doctrines, and they do not 
command students’ assent to the doctrines they take up for consideration 
and study. They investigate claims using all available means; they give their 
assent freely to those claims that strike them as true; they speak publicly on 
their areas of study; and they invite others to evaluate their claims in a like 
manner.
According to this configuration of the university, the philosophy faculty 
is not comprised entirely of what we today tend to think of as philosophers. 
Members of the 
philosophy faculty 
are not commanded 
by the state to 
believe and to teach 
particular doctrines, 
and they do not 
command student’s 
assent to the 
doctrines they take 
up for consideration 
and study.
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It isn’t even comprised entirely of people who specialize in one or more of 
the areas of study in which Kant himself specializes. The subject matter 
itself plays little or no role in carving up the university at the faculty level. 
The philosophy faculty is comprised of learned persons who are free to 
teach what we now consider to be the arts and sciences in a critical fashion, 
without interference from the other faculties and from the government. 
They are the faculty that advance learning both through and beyond what 
they inherit from their traditions.
The philosophy faculty provides essential checks on the tendency of the 
other faculties to overstep the bounds of their state-certified learning and 
their state-mandated duties. They are also the members of the university 
community that are most closely aligned, in terms of their activities, with 
the pursuits of educated nonacademics:
In addition to these incorporated scholars, there can also be scholars 
at large, who do not belong to the university but simply work on part 
of the great content of learning, either forming independent organiza-
tions, like various workshops (called academies or scientific societies), 
or living, so to speak, in a state of nature so far as learning is concerned, 
each working by himself, as an amateur and without public precepts or 
rules, at extending and propagating [his field of] learning.11
The broader use of the term “philosophy” we have in mind when we 
think about public philosophy is closely related to this ongoing activity of 
freely pursuing truth, from wherever it is that one happens to be situated, 
and in open dialogue with whomever else may be interested in the issue. 
We believe that this activity is intrinsically valuable,12 but we also believe 
that the activity is capable of enriching public life when it is undertaken 
openly in, by, and with the public. One doesn’t need to have special training 
in metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics to engage in the practices of public 
philosophy. In fact, the conversation is far less wide-ranging and rich, not 
to mention far less productive of a identifiable service to the public, when 
participation is limited to specialists in these areas of study.13
As important as it may be to recognize this broader sense of the term 
“ philosophy” within academic contexts, it is at least as important to consider 
that a great deal of this work continues to go on in independent  organizations 
and in the lives of people we might think of as “scholars at large.” Whether 
they exist within contemporary analogues of  eighteenth-century academies 
and scientific societies, or within contemporary analogues of the “state 
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of nature” vis à vis the world of “civilized” learning, there are numbers of 
 people who embody and model for others the kind of free pursuit of truth 
that we are here identifying with philosophical discourse and the practices 
of public philosophy.
Part II: Performative Publication
The discussion of philosophy above leads us beyond considerations of polit-
ical economies and cognitive geographies within academia toward a con-
sideration of the relationship between philosophy and the public sphere. 
Starting with reflections on Kant’s seminal discussion of this relationship in 
his essay “What is Enlightenment?,” we move from a focus on the freedom 
of thought that characterizes philosophy to the freedom of action that char-
acterizes sovereign and self-governing publics. Here, we draw attention to 
the power that publishing has to constitute public bodies that are animated 
by the spirit of self-governance. Making the results of philosophical inves-
tigations widely available is not simply a matter of disseminating ideas or 
providing a good or a service to individuals or groups. Publishing is also 
a way of engaging with the socially situated practices through which par-
ticular publics become articulated, grow in number and in strength, and 
become self-governing bodies.
2.1 The “Most Innocuous” Freedom
In his famous 1784 essay, “What is Enlightenment?,” Kant identifies the 
activity of enlightenment with a certain way of being public.14 After sug-
gesting that enlightenment is liberation from self-incurred immaturity 
(Unmündigkeit),15 Kant goes on to write:
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the 
freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all—freedom to 
make public use of one’s reason in all matters.16
This statement itself is, of course, a public use of Kant’s reason.
Published in the December 1784 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift 
in response to a question—“What is Enlightenment?”—Johann Friedrich 
Zöllner had posed a year earlier in the same journal,17 Kant’s essay in fact 
performs the argument it articulates.
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Kant argues that enlightenment involves the free public use of reason by 
using reason in public. The performative dimension of Kant’s essay can be 
discerned in the way he connects the public use of reason to the very activ-
ity of enlightenment itself: “the public use of one’s reason,” he writes, “must 
be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind.”18
However, precisely how free Kant’s own use of reason was, despite his 
status as a member of the faculty of philosophy, is worth considering; for 
the central distinction around which the essay is organized, that between 
public and private uses of reason, seems itself to have been necessitated by 
constraints placed on public writing by the Prussian monarch, Frederick 
the Great.
However enlightened a leader he may have been for his time, in 1784—
the year in which Kant’s essay appeared—Frederick was unequivocal in for-
bidding private persons from expressing public judgment:
A private person has no right to pass public and perhaps even disap-
proving judgment on the actions, procedures, laws, regulations, and 
ordinances of sovereigns and courts, their officials, assemblies, and 
courts of law, or to promulgate or publish in print pertinent reports 
that he manages to obtain. For a private person is not at all capable of 
making such judgment, because he lacks complete knowledge of cir-
cumstances and motives.19
It is perhaps no surprise, then, to find Kant carefully charting a distinction 
between the private and public uses of reason. The former, contractual in 
nature, is said to be subject to higher authority, while the latter is deemed 
free in the broadest, though “most innocuous” sense. By the free public use 
of reason, Kant meant: “that use which anyone may make of it as a learned 
person [Gelehrter] addressing the entire public of the world of  readers 
[vor dem ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt].”20
However, the constraint on Kant’s free use of reason in the essay can be 
felt in the way he attempts to open space for the free expression of educated 
people even as he reassures those in authority that such freedom is “most 
innocuous.” In fact, the most poignant indication that his free use of reason is 
itself constrained is perhaps this superlative insistence that the freedom asso-
ciated with it is the “unschädlichste,” the “most innocuous,” form of freedom.
The statement itself can be taken as a rather eloquent performative con-
tradiction: Kant’s public declaration that the public use of reason is “the 
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most innocuous” demonstrates the very real power it has. The superlative is 
hyperbolic, and the hyperbole gives clear voice to the tacit recognition that 
free communication can have powerful undermining effects on the abso-
lute authority of the monarch. Even if, as seems to be the case, Kant’s focus 
in the essay is on the well-being of the subjects of the Prussian state, and 
specifically on the conditions under which it can most effectively mature, 
still Kant’s strong emphasis on the harmlessness of the free public use of 
reason signals his own recognition that the state itself might see in it a 
threat to its well-being.21
Kant is a savvy thinker who understood that some things are better left 
unspoken in a world ordered by a monarch whose absolute authority seems 
to have been precisely what enabled him to allow people to “argue as much 
as you like about whatever you like.”22
Even so, however, it is worth emphasizing that in speaking publicly 
to open a space in which the reading public could mature into a genuine 
deliberative public, Kant engages in a transformative public philosophical 
practice.
In advocating in public on behalf of the practices of enlightenment, 
Kant himself continued to speak as the chair of logic and metaphysics at 
the University of Königsberg. Holding a chair in the Faculty of Philosophy, 
he, unlike the clergy of whom he speaks in the essay, would not have been 
required to relinquish his private contractual obligations in order to make 
public use of his reason. Indeed, Habermas cites a 1729 directive from 
Frederick himself enjoining all chaired professors of the faculties of law, 
medicine, and philosophy to take turns submitting to newspaper editors 
“a special note, composed in a pure and clear style of writing” designed to 
inform the public of useful truths.23
But truths, however “useful” to a monarch, can have powerful 
 transformative effects. Indeed, at the end of the essay, Kant recognizes the 
transformative power of the free public use of reason:
Thus when nature has unwrapped . . . the seed for which she cares most 
tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter 
gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby 
becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the 
principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the 
human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his 
dignity.24
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Putting his words into public practice, Kant sought to open a space in which 
a world of readers might, over time, cultivate the habits of thinking and act-
ing capable of holding even the government accountable.
2.2 Seeding Publics from a World of Readers
In his own essay on Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault ascribes to 
Baudelaire a modern attitude that captures well the spirit of Kant’s public 
essay on enlightenment. For Baudelaire, according to Foucault, modernity 
is “an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with 
the practice of the liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and vio-
lates it.”25
Kant’s essay is not merely a performance of public philosophy, it is 
also the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects and violates the 
political realities of its time. Its respect for the political realities of the 
 eighteenth-century Prussian state can be heard in the way the text carefully 
opens a space for the free use of public reason by separating it from the 
private use of reason, which remains constrained by duties to the state into 
which a private person contractually enters.26
The essay’s violation of these realities can be heard most poignantly at 
the end, when Kant suggests that freedom of thought might cultivate “in 
the mentality of the people” a freedom of action capable of transforming the 
very principles of government.27
For all its appeal to the importance of the public use of reason, as itself a 
practice of liberty that respects and violates the political realities of its time, 
Kant’s essay is situated, as Kant himself recognizes, in an inchoate public 
sphere. In the essay itself, the nascence of the public to which the essay 
is addressed comes to language in two ways: first in the distinction Kant 
articulates between the “an enlightened age [einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter]” 
and “an age of enlightenment [Zeitalter der Aufklarung],” and second, in 
the way the essay speaks of the public use of reason addressing “the entire 
public world of readers [vor dem ganzen Publicum der Leserwelt].”28
This latter formulation points to the beginning of an important trans-
formation of the public sphere as it moved from being a space of public 
authority to one in which private citizens came together to form publics 
capable of holding public authorities accountable.
Habermas suggests the significance of Kant’s formulation when he 
writes that the “history of words preserved traces of this momentous shift.” 
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He goes on to mark the eighteenth-century as the time when this shift in 
the meaning of the public took place:
Until then one spoke of the “world of readers” (Lesewelt), or simply of 
the “world” (Welt) in the sense still used today: all the world, tout le 
monde. Adelung draws a distinction between the public that gathered 
as a crowd around a speaker or actor in a public place, and the Lesewelt 
(world of readers).29
Habermas points to the appearance of the word “Publikum” in 
 eighteenth-century Germany, spreading from Berlin, as an indication that 
this new meaning of the public was gaining currency.
In speaking of the “public world of readers [Publikum der Leserwelt]” 
Kant brings something of this new meaning of Publikum to language even 
if he continues to speak of the Leserwelt. The text itself seems to articulate a 
new conception of the public.
Even if, as Ciaran Cronin rightly suggests, the manner in which Kant 
anticipates the liberal idea of the public sphere as a site for the creation and 
consolidation of public opinion is complicated by the peculiarly inscribed 
nature of Kant’s understanding of the “public” in his essay on enlightenment, 
still, it is not difficult to recognize that the essay itself goes some distance in 
seeding a public capable of gathering itself to hold governmental authorities 
accountable.30
Eileen Joy suggests the power publications have to seed publics when 
she writes that “publication” should be “understood not only as the primary 
vehicle for the dissemination of our thinking, but also as the production of 
actual publics, without which intellectual and cultural life cannot flourish 
nor be shared.”31
Such seeds must be cultivated, and much depends upon the soil into which 
they are planted. As a practice of liberty, Kant’s essay might be read as an 
attempt to seed a public the soil for which it had not yet been well prepared.
Shifting the metaphor, Dewey speaks still roughly 140 years later of 
an “inchoate public” that remains incapable of organizing itself until it 
becomes able to “canalize the streams of social action.” Here is the passage 
from The Public and Its Problems:
An inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect con-
sequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies 
1 3 2  |  t h e  g o o d  s o c i e t y  |  vol. 24, no. 2
which order their occurrence. At present, many  consequences are felt 
rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they cannot be said to be 
known, for they are not, by those who experience them, referred to 
their origins. It goes, then, without saying that agencies are not estab-
lished which canalize the streams of social action and thereby regulate 
them. Hence the publics are amorphous and unarticulated.32
In her essay, “Public Knowledge,” Noëlle  McAfee argues that Dewey has a 
three-pronged solution for the problem of an unarticulated public. First, the 
public “needs to understand the consequences and origins of its actions;” 
second, “public intelligence or knowledge needs to be cultivated,” and third, 
“people need to be reconnected with their local community where face to 
face verbal communication is possible, dialogi-
cal, and transformative.”33
Dewey’s invocation of canalization is itself 
a call for habituation, for the cultivation of a 
public aware of the consequences of its own 
actions; a public that does not simply feel, but 
perceives—a perceptive public.
It is tempting to say that we are today no 
closer than the public of Dewey’s 1927 text, or 
even that of Kant’s 1784 public essay, and yet, 
perhaps we might continue to till the soil of 
a perceptive public, to canalize the streams of 
social actions, not simply in our face to face 
conversations but also by cultivating practices 
of publication and capacities for public gathering through which a world of 
passive readers might be transformed into perceptive publics.
Part III: Public Philosophy and Articulated Publics
In the previous section, we introduced Dewey’s solution to the problem of 
an unarticulated public. In this section, we will explicate Dewey’s argument 
and develop some of its consequences.
Before turning to the details of Dewey’s argument, it’s worth highlight-
ing the relevance of Dewey’s work for questions of public philosophy. For 
Dewey, “there is no specifiable difference between philosophy and its role 
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in the history of civilization.”34 In “Philosophy and Civilization,” Dewey 
emphasizes the “concrete reality” of philosophy, identifying it as a response 
to past and present social conditions. This should not suggest that philos-
ophy is merely a reaction to these conditions. Instead, as Dewey claims, 
philosophy can also be creative of the future, but only through its critical 
response to the past and present.
Beyond this general claim about the nature of philosophy, Dewey offers 
invaluable conceptual resources for articulating how publics can come into 
being, particularly in The Public and Its Problems. Dewey believed that his 
contemporary public was inchoate. On the one hand, this is a historical 
and contextual contention. Writing in the context of the rise of the “Great 
Society”—the result of rapid industrial and technological advances in the 
early twentieth century, Dewey perceived that social conditions had outrun 
inherited political conceptions, making it difficult for the public to recog-
nize itself.
At the same time, the consequences of these developments yielded the 
very condition for the public’s self-discovery. A public, for Dewey, “consists 
of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions 
to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences 
systematically cared for.”35 This situation produced an “eclipse” of the public. 
McAfee has an excellent articulation of this paradoxical situation: “wide-
spread consequences of some human actions call a public into being (i.e., 
a public is a group affected by human actions), but when the problems 
become immense this public cannot find itself.”36
While we should not ignore the historical context of Dewey’s problem, 
we believe it is still relevant today given the continuing technological devel-
opments of our own age. How then should an inchoate public respond to 
the threat of its eclipse?
Dewey was not alone among his contemporaries in diagnosing a 
 shifting social and political landscape. In addition to the conditions of his 
time, Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems was also written in response 
to Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion and The Phantom Public. Despite 
some overlap in their diagnoses, Lippmann and Dewey propose radi-
cally divergent solutions. For Lippmann, the “phantom” public requires 
a special group of experts for the management and control of social 
affairs. Unlike Lippmann, Dewey, who was more deeply committed to 
democracy, maintained that the public could manage itself, that it could 
be autonomous.
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Along these lines, one of Dewey’s central claims in The Public and Its 
Problems is that the public’s self-discovery takes place through “continuous 
inquiry” and through the communication of the results of this inquiry:
A fact of community life which is not spread abroad so as to be a com-
mon possession is a contradiction in terms. Dissemination is some-
thing other than scattering at large. Seeds are sown, not by virtue of 
being thrown at random, but by being so distributed so as to take root 
and have a chance of growth. Communication of the results of social 
inquiry is the same thing as the formation of public opinion.37
This distinction between dissemination and scattering suggests what, for 
Dewey, is the problem of the public, namely, “the improvement of the 
methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion.”38 These two 
tasks, the communication of the results of “continuous inquiry” and the 
improvement of the means of communication return us to the question of 
public philosophy. Although Dewey does not use the term “public philos-
ophy,” we believe that these two tasks not only resonate with the definition 
of philosophy introduced in this article but also articulate the two central 
tasks of the practice of public philosophy in a digital age.
However, Dewey’s concern is less with truth than with consequences. 
Throughout Dewey’s work, he discusses knowledge as knowledge of con-
sequences of action and as a means to control these consequences as far 
as possible. McAfee refers to this in terms of “public knowledge,” which 
she defines “an understanding of how policies affect what people need and 
care about.”39 This may require us to specify further our working definition 
of philosophy. In this case, philosophy becomes inquiry for the sake of the 
knowledge of consequences and the control of these consequences.
Dewey valorizes local communities as a necessary condition for the 
development of publics. He writes, “In its deepest and richest sense a com-
munity must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse.”40 Dewey 
believed that local communities were being effaced through rapid techno-
logical development. Without a strong local community, he thought that 
the public would fail to find itself.41 To some extent, this concern applies 
today. But it also requires that we ask what constitutes a local commu-
nity in the contemporary world. Dewey himself wondered whether it was 
“possible for local communities to be stable without being static, pro-
gressive without being merely mobile?”42 To what extent is the local still 
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a condition of community and what possibilities can we imagine for local 
communities today?
While we should not uncritically accept Dewey’s insistence on the 
local, we should read it as a challenge. Dewey interpreted the technolog-
ical changes of his era as destructive of the “face-to-face” and “personal” 
relationships of local communities and therefore as an impediment to the 
development of a “great community.” Nonetheless, he maintained that the 
homogenizing tendency of technological progress might eventually allow 
for the re-cultivation of local communities.43 He invites us to imagine such 
a future, even though he may not have been able to envisage it himself. 
Dewey’s turn to the problem of local communities in the final pages of 
The Public and Its Problems is not animated by a naive nostalgia but by 
an inquiry into the possibility of communication. Consider, for example, 
his consideration of the distinction between the “fixed and frozen words of 
written speech” and “the winged words of conversation.”44 Dewey contends 
that the dissemination of ideas, knowledge, and information is most effica-
cious in conversation.45
For these reasons, Dewey’s concern for the loss of the local represents, 
more importantly, the loss of opportunity for dialogue. We might read 
Dewey’s lament for the local as a challenge to imagine, or adapt, technology 
as a means for cultivating dialogue. It might also require us to re- envision 
what we mean by “local,” or at least what we mean by “community.”46 Finally, 
this insistence on dialogue, together with his claim that publics are formed 
through the dissemination of continuous inquiry, provides an outline, if 
only a bare one, of the task of public philosophy.
Articulated Publics in a Digital Age
With the proliferation of the Internet and the advent and evolution of 
online bulletin boards, forums, blogs, and online social networks, the col-
loquial meaning of “community” has expanded well beyond that of local, 
face-to-face interactions. Such Internet platforms enable communities to 
arise whose individual members may be scattered over vast geographical 
distances. For example, websites such as apug.org and http://apug.org draw 
together photographers from a wide variety of backgrounds, nationalities, 
and professional status to share and discuss their work, new techniques, 
materials, and equipment. Likewise, collaborative software projects such as 
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Ubuntu bring together designers, programmers, and sometimes users into 
a community focused on furthering the development of the project either 
through online interactions on forums, listservs, and IRC channels, or in 
face-to-face conventions at conferences and with local user groups.
Given the existence of such communities, we are hopeful that philo-
sophical communities may emerge that are not limited by geographical or 
professional constraints, communities which could give inchoate publics 
the ability and opportunity to articulate themselves. For this to be possible, 
such communities would need to be philosophical not by professional affil-
iation but by the presence of the two freedoms of inquiry outlined above: 
the freedom from the government-sanctioned doctrinal constraints and 
the freedom to pursue the truth wherever it might lead. Such philosophical 
communities would need to be animated by a commitment to the two tasks 
Dewey identifies as critical to the self-discovery of publics: the communi-
cation of the results of “continuous inquiry” and the improvement of the 
means of communication.
There is now an abundance of online publications that serve as forums 
for philosophical discourse on issues of public interest, but such forums 
tend toward two extremes: they may be professional publications (such as 
academic blogs and journals) where the discussion of continuing inquiry 
and research takes place at such specialized levels as to be unapproachable 
by nonspecialist members of the public;47 or such discussions may happen 
in personal blogs or the web pages of popular news outlets—venues which 
allow for discussions to include most members of the general public but 
which nevertheless tend to lack the participation of academics and profes-
sionals versed in the latest relevant research.48 When specialists do publish 
in popular venues, perhaps in a newspaper column such as the New York 
Times’ The Stone, they seldom participate in the resulting discussion.49 
Moreover, discussions at online forums at either end of the spectrum com-
monly fall prey to fragmented conversations and unproductive behaviors 
such as trolling and hate speech.
A notable exception to the above is Ta-Nehisi Coates’s blog, yet while it 
succeeds in practicing public philosophy and assisting inchoate publics in 
articulating themselves as a community, Coates’s efforts highlight some of 
the risks inherent to the performance of public philosophy as a mode of 
publication in our times.50 Blogging for The Atlantic since August of 2008, 
Coates has spent years engaging a community of commenters that he would 
eventually give informal credit as collaborators on an award winning arti-
cle.51 Yet this community was constantly threatened by trolls and bad-faith 
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commenters, requiring vigilant moderation in order to maintain civility 
and collegiality. In a recent interview Coates admitted that he has become 
exhausted by such efforts, and despite his successes, the community “never 
quite became what [he] wanted it to be [because he] never really figured out 
how to get people from different perspectives in a place without defaulting 
to these usual [unproductive] conversations.”52 Hence, while Coates’s efforts 
give us reason to hope for the emergence of philosophical communities 
with the help of new forms of publications, they also remind us of the assid-
uous effort required to cultivate and maintain collegiality in the commu-
nity. As such efforts become Sisyphean or are perceived as such (even if they 
are in fact successful) by those who undertake them, their abandonment 
can easily lead to the demise of the community as such.
While Ta-Nehisi Coates’s efforts highlight some of the difficulties that 
must be faced when attempting to practice public philosophy even if one 
has the support of a major publishing venue, Yasmin Nair’s public scholar-
ship reminds us of the many difficulties that result from the current struc-
ture of academia and academic publishing.53 Following Nicholas Kristof ’s 
op-ed in the New York Times, which called on scholars to write for the gen-
eral public, Nair argued that not only are the requirements for tenure so 
onerous that they leave academics with little time to write publicly engaged 
articles, but the culture of nonremuneration for academic writing leads to 
the exploitation of the few scholars who do attempt to engage the public.54 
Since academic journals do not pay authors for their articles, scholars often 
accept it as normal when nonacademic publishers offer little to no pay for 
their contributions, but Nair warns that such academics become “scabs” 
who undermine their own ability to gain a livelihood from their labor.55 
Her arguments become more urgent when one sees that Nair herself is par-
adigmatic of the contemporary publicly engaged scholar, whose efforts to 
engage a community often go unrecognized by the traditional policies of 
academic tenure and promotion.56
Yet even if scholars wish to participate in public philosophy, there 
remains a noticeable shortage of venues (be they local or online) where 
members of the public may gather and form communities around the 
practice of philosophical inquiry: venues where the public use of reason 
is  promoted and where the specialist will not only share research with the 
public, but will engage lay readers in conversation, become attentive to the 
community’s own inquiries, and ultimately collaborate with the community 
as it continues its inquiry. Although academic outreach programs such as 
the JCI Scholar’s Program, which offers college level seminars to inmates, 
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often meet these criteria and often assist in the formation of small local 
communities, we see in the practices of digital scholarly publishing an 
opportunity for the cultivation of more enriching and articulated publics.57
Taking advantage of these opportunities will, we think, require changes 
in the makeup and function of the roles traditionally ascribed to authors, 
editors, reviewers, and readers in the world of digital scholarly communi-
cation. It will no longer suffice for expert authors to merely communicate 
the results of their inquiries to an audience of experts. Neither will it suffice 
for those same authors to communicate their findings to a  general audience 
simply by making highly specialized research intelligible to nonexperts—
though this is no doubt an improvement with regards to the development of 
publics. Nor will it suffice for readers and reviewers to approach published 
texts as finished products to be endorsed or refuted, perhaps as opportu-
nities to display intellectual superiority. Rather, we 
believe that inchoate publics will become articulated 
publics only when the practices of public scholarly 
communication are thoroughly infused with a spirit 
of collaboration and participation, so that authors 
and readers can engage in productive dialogues 
and ultimately become collaborators with regard to 
issues of public concern.
For this to be the case, authors will need to engage 
public audiences not as experts whose authority is 
beyond question, but as highly educated commu-
nity members who are as willing to listen to feed-
back and engage in conversation as they are eager to 
share their research. Authors may find their research 
enriched by such engagement by the community, 
and they may even find their role transformed into that of a co-author. As a 
consequence of such transformative encounters between authors and read-
ers, published articles need to be seen as representing research in progress, 
not finished products merely to be consumed and judged. For if readers and 
authors are to become co-investigators, the philosophical worth of a publi-
cation will lie at least as much in the conversation it sparks and the public it 
cultivates as in the ideas it generates and the results it uncovers.
Readers, for their part, will need to cultivate habits of collegial response 
in the wake of their newfound opportunity to engage the authors earlier in 
the scholarly process. While it is crucial for members of a public (however 
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inchoate it may be) to engage and contribute to research on matters of  public 
concern, fruitful engagement will require the development of habits and 
virtues constitutive of collegial behavior. As a cursory glance through the 
comments section of most online news articles will reveal, while readers are 
eager to offer feedback or engage other readers in dialogue (sadly, authors 
are mostly absent from such conversations), many such conversations fall 
prey to trolling, hate speech, or disagreements which prove unresolvable 
due to lack of collegiality of the commenters. Efforts to avoid such traps 
should be directed so as not to transform the sites for dialogue into echo 
chambers, where commenters only reply to views they already endorse and 
thereby stall the productivity of the dialogue.
Encouraging the collegial collaboration between readers qua 
co-inquirers, authors, and peer reviewers (whose work may serve to fur-
ther collaboration if it is open and publicly accessible) will thus arise as 
a new  editorial responsibility. We suspect that there are numerous ways 
in which this new editorial responsibility may be fulfilled, but here one’s 
choices will have profound impacts on the format of the publication. 
Moreover, Ta-Nehisi Coates’s experience should serve as a strong reminder 
of the arduous nature of such important work. Yet however one fulfills this 
requirement, our suspicion is that the publication will be most successful in 
articulating communities into publics if all participants, including editors, 
see themselves as members of that community.
In short, we need to recognize the role that publishing plays in the prac-
tice of public philosophy. In order to perform that role, academic publishing 
practices need to prioritize community building and collegial engagement 
between authors and readers qua community members. The current trend to 
shift academic publishing toward open access is a step in the right direction, 
but unless platforms are developed that encourage productive public dia-
logue between all actors in the publishing practice (authors, reviewers, edi-
tors, and readers) any work published in such venues will be impoverished 
because it will be cut off from the public life that lends it relevance. Without 
such dialogue, publications will remain incapable of performing what may 
be their highest calling: the articulation of communities into publics.
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NoTes
1. In 2008, the American Philosophical Association (APA) established a Com-
mittee on Public Philosophy and gave it the charge “to find and create opportunities 
to demonstrate the personal value and social usefulness of philosophy” (http://www.
publicphilosophy.org/mission.html). Two years later, that committee partnered with 
George Mason University’s Center for Global Ethics to convene a meeting at the Pacific 
Division of the APA. In that meeting, several eminent philosophers and a range of other 
interested parties discussed the value of public philosophy and together came to the 
recommendation that a Public Philosophy Network (http://publicphilosophynetwork.
ning.com) be formed. That network was formed over the course of the year following 
that meeting, and it has since grown to include nearly nine hundred members, having 
hosted regular national conferences since its founding. Further, the Pennsylvania State 
University in collaboration with Michigan State University, has received over $750,000 
in funding from the Mellon Foundation to create and develop the Public Philosophy 
Journal (http://publicphilosophyjournal.org), a public space for accessible and rigorous 
scholarly discourse on challenging issues of contemporary public concern.
2. Like so many other developments in the first decades of this century, the rise of 
public philosophy appears to have generated a space in which our traditional standards 
are brought into question by sustained reflection on, among other things, the shifting 
social and economic realities to which we seek to apply them. For an overview of the 
current state of public philosophy, see the helpful discussion provided by Weinstein, 
“Public Philosophy: Introduction.”
3. One of the most salient features of public philosophy would seem to be its 
refusal to accept that the disciplinary standards and norms that have currency within 
contemporary academic philosophy are definitive of the practice of philosophy itself. 
From the standpoint of those doing publicly engaged work outside of the academy, the 
proof of its philosophical legitimacy is not something that has to be secured beforehand 
in a way that will generate consensus among those who maintain some level of personal 
or professional skepticism.
4. Subsequent parts of this essay will elaborate on the point of connection between 
philosophy and the public that we begin to identify here, raise some critical questions, and 
offer some suggestions concerning the possibility of public philosophy in a digital age.
5. That is, the careful intellectual historian will generally find at least some dis-
crepancies between what the overall historical record indicates actually happened 
 during some time period or event that is identified as a crucial turning point, on the one 
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hand, and what it is that we continually report to ourselves about the significance of that 
time period or event, on the other.
6. For example: epistemology, value theory, metaphysics (topics); skepticism, other 
minds, relativism (problems); rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism  (methodologies). 
These are just a few of the contested ways that one can make a first cut in categorizing 
what we now understand as the discipline of philosophy.
7. In the introduction to his course on physical geography (AA, 9: 21–27), Kant 
discusses various concepts of philosophy and distinguishes between the kind of 
scholastic philosophy that was common among both Aristotelians and Wolffians in 
 eighteenth-century German contexts, on the one hand, and the more worldly oriented 
philosophy that would be done in that course of lectures, on the other. The latter way of 
doing philosophy was explicitly aimed at preparing students to take on roles within the 
broader public sphere, and not at training them to become academic philosophers. For a 
discussion of the pedagogical elements of Kant’s philosophy see Munzel, “Kant on Moral 
Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the Liberal Arts.” For a lengthier discussion of the 
relation of his lectures on physical geography and anthropology to his moral philosophy, 
see Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character.
8. Parts of the book had been written up to five years earlier, but Kant withheld 
them from publication due to political pressures. For a discussion of the context of the 
production of this work, see Mary J. Gregor’s introduction to Kant, The Conflict of the 
Faculties.
9. He also defends the faculty against the charge that the exercise of these free-
doms is harmful to the state, and articulates some of the particular differences between 
the powers and obligations of the higher faculties (theology, law, and medicine) and 
those of the lower faculty (philosophy).
10. Kant and Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Gesammelte 
Schriften.[AA: 7, 23]. English translation by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Kant, 
Wood, and Di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, 251. Italics in text.
11. AA: 7, 18 (247). Italics in text.
12. This holds at least for some people, who take pleasure in the activity itself 
and for whom the activity provides orientation, focus, balance, and fulfillment. We 
are not in a position to claim that there is intrinsic value for everyone in the pursuit, 
whether they happen to recognize it or not, but we don’t need to be committed to the 
universality of the value in order to maintain that there are some people for whom the 
value is intrinsic.
13. We are in no way disparaging the kind of scholarly discourse that is limited 
to specialists in these areas. In fact, one of the issues we confront in articulating and 
advocating for a view of philosophy broadly construed is that many of those who pres-
ent themselves as being open to this broader and more inclusive conception appear not 
to be similarly open when it comes to including philosophy more narrowly construed 
within it. We purposely refrain from motivating interest in the project of public philos-
ophy through polemical contrasts between it and the kinds of practices one is likely to 
find in philosophy departments in contemporary American universities. It is clearly the 
case that certain styles, starting points, and views are underrepresented within individ-
ual departments and within the professional discipline as a whole. However, we don’t 
see any direct correlation between relative level of representation in the profession and 
relative (intrinsic or extrinsic) value. This blocks the inference from x is relatively under-
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represented to x is of lower value, but it also blocks other inferences, including the one 
from x is relatively overrepresented to x is of lower value.
14. James Schmidt has rightly suggested that for Kant, the enlightenment is an 
activity as opposed to a period of history. See, Schmidt, “The Words We Have Lost.”
15. Unmündigkeit literally means dependence, but it is also a legal term 
 designating a “minority,” i.e., one who is under age. See, Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the 
 Enlightenment,” 52.
16. Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe). Vol. 8. Ber-
lin: G. Reimer, 1902, 36. For the English, see Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: 
‘What Is Enlightenment?’” In Kant, Kant., 55. Hereafter cited as AA: 8 with page numbers 
of the German edition followed in parenthesis by the English. Emphasis in original.
17. See, Schmidt, “What Enlightenment Was,” 77.
18. Kant, AA 8, 73 (55).
19. Cited in Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 25. 
The alleged ignorance of the public has long served to legitimize authoritarian politics. 
Emphasis in original.
20. Kant, AA 8, 37 (55).
21. In fact, this perceived threat provides the occasion for Kant’s defense of the 
rights of the philosophical faculty, and of the public use of reason more generally, in the 
Conflict of the Faculties.
22. Kant, AA 8, 37 (55). Cronin suggests that the “unprecedented militarization” of 
society and absolute rule of Frederick allowed him to be tolerant of the free expression 
of ideas. See Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 67.
23. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 25.
24. Kant, AA 8, 41–42, translation from Cronin, 78. The reference to the human 
being as “now more than a machine” is a clear reference to L’Homme Machine (1747), a 
work written by the eighteenth-century French materialist, Julian Offray de La Mettrie. 
Frederick the Great provided refuge for La Mettrie in Berlin after he was forced to flee 
the Netherlands. For more on La Mettrie and for an English translation of L’Homme 
Machine, see Mettrie, La Mettrie. Emphasis in original.
25. The Foucault Reader, 41.
26. The issues here are complex, and Cronin does a nice job of navigating them. 
See Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 54–60. James Schmidt emphasizes 
that “[p]rivate uses of reason take place in a sphere of contractual agreements where 
individuals alienate their talents to other for the purpose of advancing common goals.” 
See, Schmidt, “The Question of Enlightenment.”
27. AA 8, 41–42.
28. Ibid., 40 and 37, respectively.
29. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 26. This ges-
ture to the history of words might itself be called legomenological in the sense that it 
finds in the manner in which things are said access to the nature of a particular phe-
nomenon. (For more on legomenology, see Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 7).
30. Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 54. The gesture toward 
“ seeding” here is designed to evoke the last paragraph of Kant’s essay.
31. Joy, “A Time for Radical Hope,” 13.
32. Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 2, 1925–1953, 317. Subsequent 
references to the Collected Works will use the abbreviation LW, for Later Works, followed 
by volume number.
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33. McAfee, “Public Knowledge,” 147–48.
34. Dewey, LW3, 5.




39. McAfee, “Public Knowledge,” 150.





45. The theoretical background for this argument is developed more thoroughly 
in chapter 5 of Experience and Nature, “Nature, Communication and Meaning.” In this 
chapter, Dewey identifies communication, as opposed to expression, as the heart of lan-
guage (141). He argues that language comes into being within the context of community, 
in particular in situations of mutual assistance and direction (139).
46. This task is consistent with Dewey’s discussion of meaning and essence in 
Experience and Nature. Dewey uses as an example the transformation of the meaning of 
“jurisdiction” from a geographical area to the power to act (LW1 155–56). This example 
might also serve as the basis for a critique of Dewey’s discussion of the local in The Public 
and Its Problems, licensing us to imagine a new form of locality.
47. Projects such as the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 
(http://social-epistemology.com) have had commendable success in initiating and main-
taining productive dialogues between researchers and academic readers, but the technical 
level of the articles makes it unlikely that nonspecialists will engage in the conversation.
48. This is not to disvalue the inquiry performed by nonspecialist members of 
the public, but rather to stress that research carried out by specialists is a great asset to 
a public’s self-articulation.
49. The Stone can be found at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-
stone/.




52. Eva Holland, “‘It’s Yours’: A Short History of the Horde.” Longreads Blog, 
 February 4, 2015. Accessed March 22, 2015. http://blog.longreads.com/2015/02/04/its-
yours-a-short-history-of-the-horde.
53. Yasmin Nair’s blog can be found at: http://www.yasminnair.net.
54. Yasmin Nair, “Scabs: Academics and Others Who Write for Free.” Yasmin 
Nair, March 11, 2014.
55. Ibid. See also “On Writers as Scabs, Whores, and Interns, and the Jacobin 
Problem,” Yasmin Nair, December 10, 2013.
56. Without a stable academic appointment to support her scholarship, and faced 
with publishers who expected her to write for free, or for little pay, Nair now requests 
subscriptions (priced at $2, $5, or $10 a month) from the readers of her personal blog. 
While it remains to be seen whether Nair’s subscription model will be successful, her case 
reminds us of the challenges that face academics who wish to engage an inchoate public
1 4 4  |  t h e  g o o d  s o c i e t y  |  vol. 24, no. 2
57. The JCI Scholar’s Program can be found at http://www.prisonscholarsprogram 
.com. These ideals and this vision animate our own work in developing the Public 
 Philosophy Journal (http://www.publicphilosophyjournal.org) as one such place where 
an enriching and articulated public might be cultivated.
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